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VOLUME- XLIII JANUARY 1969 NUMBER 3
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND THE NLRB
MARVIN ROTH*
HSTORY AND PROOEDURB
Section 8(b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act1
was originally enacted in 1947 as one of the Taft-Hartley
amendments to the Act. It proscribes strikes and other
union pressure in furtherance of secondary boycotts and
jurisdictional disputes which are engaged in to compel an
employer or self-employed person to join a labor organiza-
tion, or in certain limited instances, to compel an employer
to recognize the union. Concurrently with the enactment
of section 8(b) (4), Congress in section 10(1) of the Act 2
directed the National Labor Relations Board to seek ap-
propriate injunctive relief in the United States district
courts during the pendency of litigation before the Board
concerning alleged violations of section 8(b) (4); and in
section 10(j) 3 empowered the Board to seek pendente lite
relief against all other types of unfair labor practices,
whether committed by an employer, labor union, or both.
*Senior Attorney, National Labor Relations Board; B.A., 1952, Rutgers
University; J.D., 1955, Rutgers Law School; Member of the New Jersey
Bar. The views expressed by Mr. Roth are his own, unless otherwise
indicated, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Board or the Office
of its General Counsel.
1 National Labor Relations Act § 8(b) (4), 61 Stat 141 (1947), as
amended, 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).2 National Labor Relations Act § 10(1), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), as amended,
73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1964).
3 National Labor Relations Act § 10(j), 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§160(j) (1964).
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The reasons for the enactment of sections 10(1) and 10(j)
were cogently stated in the Senate report on the bill which
became the Taft-Hartley Act:
[T]he Committee has concluded that five specific practices by
labor organizations and their agents, affecting commerce, should be
defined as unfair labor practices. Because of the nature of certain
of these practices, especially jurisdictional disputes, and secondary
boycotts and strikes for specifically defined objectives, the com-
mittee is convinced that additional procedures must be made
available under the National Labor Relations Act in order
adequately to protect the public welfare which is inextricably
involved in labor disputes.
Time is usually of the essence in these matters, and conse-
quently the relatively slow procedure of Board hearing and order,
followed many months later by an enforcing decree of the circuit
court of appeals, falls short of achieving the desired objectives
-the prompt elimination of the obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and encouragement of the practice and procedure of free
and private collective bargaining. Hence we have provided that
the Board, acting in the public interest and not in vindication of
purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief in the case of
all types of unfair labor practices and that it shall also seek relief
in the case of strikes and boycotts defined as unfair labor
practices ...
Experience under the National Labor Relations Act has
demonstrated that by reason of lengthy hearing and litigation
enforcing its orders, the Board has not been able in some instances
to correct unfair labor practices until after substantial injury has
been done. Under the present act the Board is empowered to seek
interim relief only after it has filed in the appropriate circuit court
of appeals its order and the record on which it is based. Since
the Board's orders are not self-enforcing, it has sometimes been
possible for persons violating the act to accomplish their unlawful
objective before being placed under any legal restraint and thereby
to make it impossible or not feasible to restore or preserve the
status quo pending litigation.
In subsections (j) and (1) to section 10 the Board is given
additional authority to seek injunctive relief. By section 10(j),
the Board is authorized, after it has issued a complaint alleging
the commission of unfair labor practices by either an employer
or a labor organization or its agent' to petition the appropriate
district court for temporary relief or restraining order. Thus the
Board need not wait if the circumstances call for, such relief,
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until it has held a hearing, issued its order, and petitioned for
enforcement of its order. 4
In 1959 Congress enacted the Landrum-Griffin amend-
ments to the Act, which inter alia, closed certain "loopholes"
in section 8(b) (4), prohibited so-called "hot cargo" agree-
ments, with certain exceptions in the construction and
garment industries (section 8(e)), and established a com-
prehensive scheme governing recognition and organizational
picketing (section 8(b) (7)). The mandatory injunction
provisions of section 10(1) were extended to cases arising
under sections 8(e) and 8(b) (7) . Sections 10(j) and
10 (1) in their present form provide as follows:
(j) The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint
as provided in subsection (b) charging that any person has
engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition
any district court of the United States . . . within any district
wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have
occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business,
for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the
filing of any such petition the court shall cause notice thereof
to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdic-
tion to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining
order as it deems just and proper.
(1) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (A),
(B), or (C) of section 8(b), or section 8(e) or section. 8(b) (7),
the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith
and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character
in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after
such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the
matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge
is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of
4S. REP. No. 105, 80th CONG., 1st SEss., 8, 27; 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REATIONS Acr or 1947, 414, 433 (1947).
S Senator Goldwater noted that picketing requires the same sanctions
as secondary boycotts, if its use is to be curtailed because like secondary
boycotts, its prolonged use forces the employer to go out of business or his
employees to join the union. 105 CONG. REc. 5959 (1959); 2 LEGISLATW
HIsToRY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DisCLosuRE AcT or
1959, 1192 (1959).
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the Board, petition any district court of the United States ...
within any district where the unfair labor practice in question has
occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person
resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief
pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such
matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district court
shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary
restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding
any other provision of law: Provided further, that no temporary
restraining order shall be issued without notice unless a petition
alleges that substantial and irreparable injury to the charging party
will be unavoidable and such temporary restraining order shall be
effective for no longer than five days and will become void at the
expiration of such period: ... . Upon filing of any such petition
the courts shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any person
involved in the charge and such person, including the charging
party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and
present any relevant testimony: .... In situations where such relief
is appropriate the procedure specified herein shall apply to charges
with respect to section 8(b) (4) (D).1
The "slow procedure" of litigation referred to in the
foregoing Senate report normally contemplates the filing
of an unfair labor practice charge and its investigation by
a regional office of the Board; issuance of a complaint by
the regional office when the charge has merit; a hearing
before a trial examiner of the Board, followed by the issu-
ance of trial examiner's decision and the filing of exceptions
to that decision; and the issuance of the Board's decision
and order in the case. The Board order, however, carries
no sanctions unless and until it is enforced by a court of
appeals. As noted in the Senate report, the Wagner Act
-661 Stat. 149 (1947), 'as wmended, 73 Stat 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§§160(j)(1) (1964). The last sentence of section 10(1) takes cognizance
of the unique procedure involved in jurisdictional dispute cases. Where the
parties to the dispute have not adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the
voluntary adjustment of the dispute, the Board's regional officer, upon
determining that there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation has
been committed, will not initially issue a complaint, but will set the matter
down for hearing in order that the Board on the record of that hearing,
may first resolve the dispute out of which the alleged unfair labor practice
arose. Appropriate injunctive relief is mandatory, as in other cases covered
by section 10(1). See, e.g., Local 450, Operating Engineers v. Elliot
(Sline Indus. Painters), 256 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1958).
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empowered the Board to seek interim injunctive relief only
after it had petitioned the court of appeals for enforcement
of its final order in the case.
Since 1947 the district courts have granted more than
900 injunctions pursuant to section 10 (1) and more than 80
pursuant to section 10 (j). In hundreds of other cases, most
of which involved violations covered by section 10(1), the
filing of a petition for an injunction has resulted in the
cessation of the alleged unfair labor practices without the
necessity for issuance of an injunction order. One judge
was moved to quote a statement to the effect that the
lengthy process of litigation before the Board means that
"apart from the cases being conducted under the shelter
of a preliminary injunction, the ultimate decision almost
never makes any practical difference to the labor relations
between the parties." I Of course time is not of the essence
in every case, and the Board's ultimate decision and order
may effectively remedy the unfair labor practices found
and govern future relations between parties involved.
However, the interim injunction is undoubtedly an effective
instrument in aid of the Board's jurisdiction.
Section 10(1) directs that the investigation of unfair
labor practice charges covered by that section shall be
made forthwith and given priority treatment; and that "the
officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be re-
ferred" shall petition for an injunction if after the investi-
gation he has reasonable cause to believe such charge is
true and that a complaint shall issue. Whether the con-
duct of a preliminary investigation is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to the granting of an injunction, and whether the
petitioner's subjective determination that the charge is
meritorious is a proper subject for inquiry in the injunc-
tion proceeding, are issues which in the past were the sub-
jects of continuing litigation resulting in conflicting deci-
7NLRB v. Superior Fireproof Door & Sash Co., 289 F.2d 713, n.6
(2d Cir. 1961) (J. Friendly).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sions 5 However, these issues were resolved in the negative
and apparently put to rest by a trio of appellate decisions.'
In Calumet Contractors,"0 the Seventh Circuit upheld a
district court's refusal to compel Board agents to testify
concerning the conduct or extent of the preliminary in-
vestigation, or concerning the decisional processes pursuant
to which an injunction was sought. The appeals court
observed:
It is our opinion that the scope, conduct or extent of the
preliminary investigation are not matters relevant or material for
consideration on the issue to be adjudicated on hearing of a
Section 10(1) petition, i.e., whether reasonable cause exists to
believe a violation has occurred. This issue is to be resolved by
the evidence adduced by the Board in open court to sustain its
petition. The Board is enjoined to make a preliminary investiga-
tion but the adequacy of the investigation is judicially tested only
by the Board's subsequent ability to sustain its initial determination
that the investigation disclosed reasonable cause to believe that a
violation occurred."
The First Circuit arrived at a similar conclusion in the
Winwa e 12 decision. That court further held that proceed-
ings under section 10(1) were exempt from the provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."3
Ordinarily the petition for an injunction is filed in the
name of the director of the regional office wherein the
charge was filed, acting on behalf of the Board. However,
the regional director's authority to institute injunction pro-
ceedings is subordinate to that of the General Counsel of
the Board, who pursuant to section 3(d) of the Act exer-
sThe Board's own Statements of Procedure describes the procedure for
the investigation of unfair labor practice charges. 29 C.F.R. § 101.4 (1968).
9 McLeod v. Teamsters Local 239 (Abbey Auto Parts Corp.), 330 F2d
108 (2d Cir. 1964); Building Trades Council v. Alpert (Winwake, Inc.),
302 F.2d 594 (1st Cir. 1962); Madden v. Hod Carriers Local 41, 277 F2d
688 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1960). Compare Sperandeo
v. Milk Drivers Union (Sealtest Foods), 334 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1964),
discussed infra.1o Madden v. Hod Carriers Local 41, 277 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1960).
11 Id. at 693.
'1 Building Trades Council v. Alpert, 302 F2d 594 (1st Cir. 1962).
1347 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (1964).
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cises general supervision over regional officers and has final
authority with respect to the investigation of charges and
issuance and prosecution of complaints. Thus the decision
to seek a temporary injunction under section 10(1) may
have been made in the regional office, or by the regional
director in consultation with the office of the General Coun-
sel, or by the General Counsel in reversing or disagreeing
with a regional director's determination that no injunction
be sought. In Abbey Auto Parts," the second circuit re-
jected a contention that the district court erred in granting
an injunction because the General Counsel had administra-
tively reversed the regional director's determination not
to issue a complaint in the case; hence the "officer or
regional attorney" did not actually believe that an unfair
labor practice had been committed. The appeals court held
that section 10(1) did not
require that the regional director must make a determination of
reasonable cause wholly on the basis of his own independent judg-
ment, without the direction of his superior officer.... If the Union
felt that the issuance of an injunction was unwarranted, it should
have attempted to prove that reasonable cause did not exist, rather
than seeking to psychoanalyze the regional director in an effort to
demonstrate that he didn't really believe what he had alleged in
his petition.' 5
Applications by the Board for interim injunctive re-
lief may be filed in any federal district wherein the re-
spondent union or employer resides or transacts business,
or wherein the alleged unfair labor practices have occurred;
notwithstanding an apparent preference on the part of dis-
trict court judges that these proceedings be conducted in
the latter where practicable.4  Sections 10(j) and 10(1)
24"McLeod v. Teamsters Local 239, 330 F2d 108 (2d Cir. 1964).
'Id. at 112. Section 10(j) empowers the five member Board rather than
the Board's regional officer, to seek interim injunctive relief. However, these
proceedings are also filed in the name of the regional director, acting on
behalf of the Board. The regional director need not plead or prove that the
Board authorized him to petition for an injunction, as a government official is
entitled to a presumption of regularity in his official acts. See Fusco v.
Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
20 See Penello v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Empl. Union (Mayco, Inc.),
156 F. Supp. 366 (D. Md. 1957).
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are thus exceptions to the general venue statute governing
civil actions in the federal district courts. 7  However, the
proceeding is subject to the power of the district court, for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest
of justice, to transfer a civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought.
In practice, upon the filing of the petition for an in-
junction, the matter is brought on for hearing for the issu-
ance of an order directing the respondent to show cause
why the injunction should not be granted. In some courts
the petition is set down on the motion calendar. The hear-
ing date, depending upon the court's docket, is usually from
four to ten days after the petition is filed. To help frame
the issues, the order to show cause usually directs that the
respondent file an answer shortly before the hearing. Sec-
tions 10(j) and 10(1) thus provide a method of procedure
which takes precedence over the provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure relating to commencement of ac-
tions and pleadings. To follow these provisions, with all
their attendant delays, would frustrate the congressional
intent to provide for speedy injunctive relief.'9 The same
consideration, namely the need for speedy injunctive relief,
generally governs the applicability of the Federal Rules
concerning depositions and discovery. The district courts
ordinarily will not permit the taking of depositions, in-
terrogatories, or other discovery which would preclude a
swift hearing on the petition for an injunction."
Section 10(1) empowers the district court to grant a
temporary restraining order without notice, effective for
no longer than five days, upon an allegation by the regional
director that substantial and irreparable injury to the
charging party will otherwise be unavoidable. The regional
director may apply for a temporary restraining order upon
17 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1964).
'sSee Reynolds v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 53 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,068
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).19See mtpra note 4.
20 See Fusco v. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Ohio 1962);
Schauffler v. Local 1291, ILA (Northern Metal Co.), 189 F. Supp. 737
(E.D. Pa. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 292 F2d 182 (3d Cir. 1961).
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the filing of the petition or at any subsequent stage in the
proceedings. The term "without notice" has been judicially
construed to mean without notice and an opportunity to be
heard on the petition; hence the temporary restraining
order may be extended without the consent of the respond-
ent once the hearing has commenced.2 Temporary restrain-
ing orders under section 10(j) are apparently subject to
the 10 day limitation specified in Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Although section 10 (1) refers
to injury to the charging party, district courts have taken
into consideration threatened injury to other persons in-
volved, and to the general public, when issuing temporary
restraining orders. Illustrative of situations in which re-
straining orders have been granted are those which involve
violence or mass picketing, or a strike which adversely
affects national defense or operation of an industry or
facility deemed vital to the public welfare; a work stoppage
which threatens the loss of perishable goods; or a strike
which will result in insolvency; or substantial financial loss
to the employer involved; or the irreparable loss of a busi-
ness relationship.
The hearing on an application for an injunction usually
entails the taking of oral testimony, although some courts
have directed that these proceedings be submitted on affi-
davits. No appellate court has squarely considered the
question of whether the Board or the respondent is entitled,
as a matter of right, to present oral testimony in these
proceedings.22 The necessity for oral testimony, including
cross-examination, would seem to turn on the extent to
which the district court is called upon to resolve issues of
credibility.23
The courts are in agreement that as in the case of tradi-
tional equity practice with respect to interlocutory relief,
21See Schauffler v. Highway Truck Drivers (E. A. Gallagher & Sons),
182 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Douds v. Wine, Liquor & Distillery
Workers (Schenley Distillers Corp.), 75 F. Supp. 184 (N.D.N.Y. 1948).
22A thorough discussion of this issue is contained in a recent district
court decision. See Kennedy v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 108 (Reliable
Steel Supply Co.), 68 L.R.R.M. 3058, 3070-74 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
23 See text accompanying notes 29-32, infra.
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the issue before the district court in these proceedings is
whether there is reasonable cause to believe that a violation
of the Act, as charged, has been committed, and what, if
any, injunctive relief is just and proper in the circumstances
of the case. " However, the courts have differed in their
application of the "reasonable cause" test; and the "just
and proper" criteria has been the subject of continual liti-
gation, particularly with respect to the Board's discretion
to seek injunctive relief under section 10(j).
Tv "REAsoNABLE CAUSE" TEST
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has defined the
reasonable cause standard and set forth the rationale for
that standard:
The Board need not show that an unfair labor practice has been
committed, but need only demonstrate that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the elements of an unfair labor practice are
present. Nor need the Board conclusively show the validity of
the propositions of law underlying its charge; it is required to
demonstrate merely that the propositions of law which it has
applied to the charge are substantial and not frivolous....
If, in a Section 10(1) proceeding, a district court or a court of
appeals undertook to finally adjudicate such questions it would not
be acting consistently with the congressional policy underlying
Section 10(1). That Section's usefulness as a tool with which the
status quo may be preserved pending final adjudication would be
diminished insofar as the Board would be required to finally litigate
questions of substance at a preliminary stage. Moreover, the court
would not have the benefit of the Board's opinion on questions
of fact and novel questions of labor law when making its decision.
2 4 Every court of appeals, with the exception of the District of Columbia
Circuit, has reviewed the granting or denial of a section 10(j) or 10(1)
injunction. All have held that the prerequisite to an injunction is a finding
of reasonable cause and that relief is just and proper. The Supreme Court
has not reviewed any of these proceedings, but has held that the denial
of a 10(1) injunction was not a decision on the merits of the case, and
therefore was not res judicata as to the issues involved. NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Gould & Preisner), 341 U.S. 675, 681-82
(1951).
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Thus, the court would, to some extent, usurp the Board's function
as the primary fact finder in cases arising under the Act and its
function as primary interpreter of the statutory scheme. 25
There is general agreement that in proceedings of this
nature the Board need not adduce evidence to the extent
required for enforcement of a Board order after full hearing
on the merits; that detailed presentation of evidence in an
injunction hearing is neither contemplated by the Act nor
necessary in fact.' The Chicago Calumet Stevedoring case 27
illustrates this distinction between injunction and enforce-
ment proceedings. In that case the Seventh Circuit affirmed
a district court order which enjoined the International
Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots (MMP) from
engaging in an alleged secondary boycott. MMP contended
in both the injunction and Board proceedings that it was
not a labor organization within the meaning of the Act
because its membership was composed of supervisory per-
sonnel, and therefore the Board did not have jurisdiction
over its activities. The Seventh Circuit rejected this con-
tention in the injunction appeal, holding that the district
court properly found reasonable cause to believe that MMP
was a labor organization, because the evidence showed that
MMP and its affiliated locals had conceded in other cases
and pleadings that they were labor organizations. How-
ever, when the Board ultimately held MMP to be a labor
organization on the basis of prior adjudications, pleadings,
admissions and the MMP constitution, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia refused to grant enforcement,
but instead remanded the case to the Board to ascertain
whether rank and file employees were included as members
of MMP in substantial numbers or proportion, and whether
they participated in MMP in a substantial and meaningful
manner.2
2GSchauffler v. Local 1291, ILA (Northern Metal Co.), 292 F.2d 182,
.187-88 (3d Cir. 1961).
26See, e.g., Douds v. Local 294, Teamsters (Conway's Express), 75 F.
Supp. 414 (N.D.N.Y. 1947).
27Madden v. Masters, Mates & Pilots, 259 F2d 312 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 909 (1958).28 Masters, Mates & Pilots v. NLRB, 48 L.R.R.M. 2624 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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In ascertaining whether the elements of an unfair labor
practice are present, must the district court resolve issues
of credibility raised by conflicting testimony? The question
suggests three possible approaches, each of which has ob-
tained some judicial support. The opinion of Judge Larkins
in Johnston 'v. J. P. Stevens d Co.2" implies that the court
must resolve issues of credibility in the same manner as
any other trier of the facts. In that case the Board sought
injunctive relief to compel the company to reinstate 18 em-
ployees who were allegedly discriminatorily discharged, and
to refrain from unlawfully interfering with the union's
efforts to organize the company's plants in Roanoke Rapids,
North Carolina. The case was submitted on affidavits, but
the court was unable to find reasonable cause to believe
that the company engaged in unfair labor practices, in part
because the Board's affidavits were substantially refuted
by the company's affidavits. However, this approach virtu-
ally necessitated the taking of oral testimony, including
cross-examination, in order to enable the Board to present
a case upon which injunctive relief could be granted.
A diametrically opposite approach was taken by Judge
Sarah Hughes in another ease in which the Board also
sought to reinstate discriminatorily discharged employees
and to enjoin employer interference with an organizing
campaign."0 Judge Hughes held that the court, under the
Act, was not required to make final or even preliminary
findings as to the truth or falsity of the facts alleged in
the petition of the Board. This approach suggests that the
burden of reasonable cause is met upon the Board's pre-
sentation of a prima facie case, and renders the taking of
oral testimony unnecessary.
A third approach, and one commensurate with the
court's responsibility to act neither as a rubber stamp nor
as the "primary fact finder," has attained the widest judi-
cial acceptance. That is, that the court may not resolve
conflicting factual evidence and questions of credibility if
the Board might reasonably resolve those issues in favor
29234 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
30Elliott v. DuBois Chemicals, 201 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Tex. 1962).
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of the petitioner." This test would normally warrant the
taking of oral testimony, including cross-examination, at
least for the purpose of ascertaining whether the evidence
adduced in support of the petition for an injunction was
inherently incredible or effectively and conclusively refuted
by other evidence.
The conclusion that the Board is required to demon-
strate merely that the propositions of law which it has
applied to the charge are substantial and not frivolous,
leaves an apparent gray zone. This writer, and indeed any
court, would hesitate to suggest that the General Counsel
of the Board ever sought an injunction on the basis of a
frivolous proposition of law.2
Two district court judges have raised considerations
which, if applied to the propositions of law advanced in
an injunction proceeding, would impose upon the Board a
higher standard than the reasonable cause test. Judge J.
Skelly Wright, although conceding that the reasonable
cause test applied to the sufficiency of the Board's evidence,
stated that this limited statutory jurisdiction "does not
blind the court to the fact that it has the most potent weap-
on in labor management relations in its hands and the First
Amendment at its elbow." " Noting that there may be
some remaining vitality in Thornhill v. Alabama, 34 which
would protect non-coercive, peaceful, informational picketing
with no substantial side effects, Judge Wright stated that
he preferred to construe the proscriptions of the Act so as
to avoid enjoining such conduct. Another court, in denying
an injunction, cited Supreme Court authority to the effect
that section 13 of the Act is a command of Congress to
31 Sec Fusco v. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ohio 1962);
Jaffee v. Henry Hiede, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
32Judge Steel defined a reasonable determination as the antithesis of
one which is arbitrary, illogical or irrational. Dooley v. Teamsters Local 107,
192 F. Supp. 193 (D. Del. 1961). On the other hand, Judge Goldsborough
commented that "a matter can be logical without being reasonable. Logic
is a good servant, but it is a terrible master." Madden v. United Mine
Workers, 79 F. Supp. 616, 618 (D.D.C. 1948).
33 LeBus v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, Local 60 (Houston
Contracting Co.), 199 F. Supp. 628, 634 n.27 (E.D. La. 1961).
34310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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resolve doubts and ambiguities in favor of an interpretation
of the unfair labor practice provisions which safeguard the
right to strike as understood prior to passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act. 5
These considerations-the free speech aspect of picket-
ing, and Congressional intent to preserve the right to
strike-if applied to injunction proceedings in the manner
suggested in the above opinions, would negate the reason-
able cause test with respect to legal issues arising in man-
datory injunction actions under section 10(1), as either or
both considerations are present to some degree in nearly
every alleged unfair labor practice which is subject to the
mandatory injunction. Nevertheless, the constitutional
power of Congress to proscribe picketing and strikes con-
ducted in furtherance of an object deemed unjustifiable by
that body, is well established," and the intent of Congress
to curb the evils it deemed inherent in certain specified
strikes, picketing and boycotts, is entitled to at least as
much weight as its desire generally to protect the right to
strike. While the desire to protect free speech and the
right to strike are appropriate considerations when the
Board and appellate courts are ultimately resolving issues
of statutory interpretation and application of the law, the
congressional intent to preserve these issues for orderly
determination by the Board through use of the injunction
procedure, dictates that in such proceedings the Board need
only establish that the propositions of law upon which it
relies are reasonable in light of statutory language, legisla-
tive history, logic and relevant Board and court decisions.
The limited discretion vested in the district courts by
section 10(1) has not precluded some judges from making
constructive contributions to the development of labor law.
Thus, the "ally" or "struck work" doctrine, as applied to
secondary boycott cases under the Act, "had its origin in
35 Penello v. Local 59, Sheet Metal Workers (E.I. DuPont), 195 F.
Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1961). Section 13 provides: "Nothing in this Act,
except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either
to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,
or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."86 See Electrical Workers v. NLRB (Samuel Langer), 341 U.S. 694,
705 & n.10 (1951).
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a well reasoned opinion by Judge Rifkind in the Ebasco
case." 11 Judge Wright's conclusion in the DuPont case,"8
that section 8(b) (4) (D) proscribes only conduct in fur-
therance of disputes between rival groups of employees and
does not extend to claims for work being performed by
members of a union which does not dispute the striking
union's right to that work, was adopted by the Board in
the Safeway case.3 9  Similarly, the Board adopted Judge
Rayfiel's conclusion that the secondary boycott provisions
of the Act did not protect two firms which, although not
commonly owned or controlled, had such "identity and
community of interests" as would negate the claim that
one was neutral as to the other's labor disputes. 0 Judge
Wyzanski held that the secondary boycott provision of the
Act proscribed appeals (as opposed to threats) only to
those individuals who perform manual or clerical services,
or minor supervisory functions, and not to those who have
power on behalf of their employer to terminate or otherwise
control business relations with the primary employer. 1
As the foregoing cases suggest, precedent-maling deci-
sions in injunction cases have usually formed the basis for
denial, rather than granting, of injunctive relief. This is
entirely consistent with the statutory scheme. The proposi-
tions of law to be tested are those of the petitioner, and
the district courts are not free to seek alternative bases
upon which the finding of a violation of the law may be
predicated, such as might be suggested by the charging
party. To do so would violate the spirit, and probably the
letter of the Norris-LaGuardia, Act.42
37 Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y.
1948), cited in NLRB v. Business Mach. Mechanics (Royal Typewriter
Co.), 228 F.2d 553, 557 (2d Cir. 1955).
38 195 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1961).
39 192 F. Supp. 19S (D. Del. 1961).40 Kaynard v. Teamsters Local 282, 200 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
41 See Alpert v. Teamsters Local 379 (Consalvo Trucking, Inc.), 184
F. Supp. 558 (D. Mass. 1960).42 See McLeod v. Mechanics Conference Bd. Local 459 (Remington
Rand Univac Div., Inc.), 300 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1962). Compare Retail
Clerks v. Food Employers Council, Inc., 351 F.2d 525, 529 n.2 (9th Cir.
1965).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In Remington Rand,43 the Second Circuit held that the
petitioner must demonstrate reasonable cause to believe
that the Board -will sustain the unfair labor practice charge
(because section 10(1) relief is limited to Board adjudica-
tion), and reasonable cause to believe that a Board decision
finding a violation will be enforced by a court of appeals.
The court reversed a district court order enjoining hand-
billing of businesses which leased equipment from Rand,
with whom the union had its dispute, appealing to the
public not to patronize those firms. The court reversed
the injunction because recent Board precedents indicated
that the Board would not find a violation as alleged by the
General Counsel.
However, several decisions at the district court and
appellate level have indicated that injunctive relief is not
precluded by adverse Board or courts of appeals precedent,
so long as the position taken by the General Counsel is in-
herently reasonable and therefore might ultimately become
established law, at the Supreme Court level if necessary.
In one case, which arose prior to the Landrum-Griffin amend-
ments, a district court enjoined a union, in furtherance of
its dispute with an iron mining company, from picketing
to induce railway employees to join its strike." The court
noted the anomaly of the General Counsel's requesting an in-
junction in the face of Board decisions holding that a rail-
way and its employees were not protected by the secondary
boycott provisions of the Act. However, the court found
that a decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, relied
upon by petitioner, but contrary to Board law, presented a
"sound, realistic and impelling construction of the Act,"
warranting reasonable cause to believe that railroads fell
within the protection of the ban on secondary boycotts.43
Only two years after the Remington Rand decision, a dis-
trict court in New York was faced with conflicting posi-
tions between the Board and the Court of Appeals for the
43 McLeod v. Mechanics Conference Bd. Local 459, 300 F.2d 237 (2d Cir.
1962).44 Knapp v. United Steelworkers (Pittsburgh Pacific Co.), 179 F. Supp.
90 (D. Minn. 1959).
45Id. at 95.
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District of Columbia concerning the legality of certain types
of contract clauses alleged to be violative of section 8(e),
the "hot cargo" provision of the Act. The General Counsel
contended, on the basis of the Board precedent, and the
district court found, reasonable cause to believe that the
clause under attack was unlawful, and enjoined the union
from giving effect to that clause. The Second Circuit
affirmed the injunction, notwithstanding that the union
could have appealed any Board decision finding a violation
to the District of Columbia Circuit, which presumably on
the basis of its own precedent would have reversed the
Board order.46 In another case, involving an alleged juris-
dictional dispute, a Delaware district court denied the
union's motion to dissolve a section 10(1) injunction be-
cause the Board, following its then established precedent,
had declined to make an affirmative award of the disputed
work, but merely held that the respondent union was not
entitled to strike to obtain the disputed work.7 Noting that
the Third Circuit had expressly disapproved that practice in
prior decisions, the union contended that the injunction
should be dissolved because any future Board order in the
case, finding a violation, would be unenforceable. However,
the district court, notwithstanding the precedent in its own
circuit, refused to dissolve the injunction, noting that the
issue raised by the conflict between the Board and Third
Circuit decisions was pending before the Supreme Court in
another case. I
The reverse of the coin, that is, Board or court prece-
dent in support of the General Counsel's proposition of law,
affords no assurance that a district court will grant an in-
junction on the basis of that proposition of law. One dis-
trict court judge refused to enjoin a strike to compel an
employer association to enter into an alleged "hot cargo"
agreement covering subcontracting of construction work,
because he believed that Board precedent holding such con-
4GMcLeod v. AFTRA (Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.), 234 F. Supp.
832 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 351 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1965).
47 Dooley v. Highway Truck Drivers (Safeway), 190 F. Supp. 112
(D. Del. 1960).
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duct to be unlawful was contrary to the plain language of
the Act. 8  The judge quoted Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v.
United States,4" to the effect that "the construction of a
new statute by the agency administering it is entitled to
'peculiar weight,' but that "administrative practice does
not avail to overcome a statute so plain in its commands as
to leave nothing for construction." 10
In evaluating the petitioner's legal theories, the district
court may take into consideration 1) relevant statutory
language; 2) Board and judicial decisions; 3) the legisla-
tive history of the Act; and 4) the rules of logic, which
become particularly significant when the other factors offer
no guidance. When a .proposition of law is supported by at
least one of these factors, the district court will usually hold
for the petitioner unless that factor is clearly outweighed by
the other considerations. Thus, in the DuPont case,5 where
the petitioner's interpretation of section 8(b) (4:) (D), the
jurisdictional dispute provision of the Act, was supported
by the literal language of that section and by Board prece-
dent, the district court concluded that these factors were
outweighed by 1) the language of section 10(k), the com-
panion provision to section 8(b) (4) (D); 2) the rationale
of the Supreme Court in the CBS case,52 which although
not directly in point, appeared to refute petitioner's inter-
pretation of section 8(b) (4) (D); 3) the apparent irra-
tionality of reaching a section 10(k) determination on the
facts of the case; and, 4) legislative history. The court dis-
counted the Board decisions relied upon by the petitioner
because they were "pre-CBS."
Perhaps the best illustration of the reasonable cause
test as applied to a legal issue may be found in the Knight
Newspapers case. 3  A Miami local union, in furtherance
48 Cuneo v. Essex County Carpenters (Associated Contractors of Essex
County), 207 F. Supp. 932 (D.N.J. 1962).
49288 U.S. 294 (1933).
50 207 F. Supp. at 944.
5'Penello v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 59, 195 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del.
1961).
52NLRB v. Radio and Television Broadcast Engineers, Local 1212,
364 U.S. 573 (1961).
63 Roumell v. Miami Printing Pressmen, 198 F. Supp. 851 (D. Mich.
1961).
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of its dispute with the Miami Herald, picketed the premises
of the Detroit Free Press. Both newspapers were owned
by the Knight Newspaper chain, though in the form of
separate corporate entities. The petitioner contended that
the picketing was unlawful because the newspapers were
not commonly controlled. The court questioned the ap-
plicability of this "common control doctrine" to secondary
boycott situations, noting that the concept of neutrality as
a condition of an employer's claim to protection from an
alleged secondary boycott was supported by court decisions
and legislative history, and that Knight Newspapers was
clearly not neutral to the dispute between the Miami Herald
and the union. The court commented that the reason for
the "common control doctrine" was not clear, but that its
applicability to secondary boycott situations had been up-
held by decisions of the First and Eighth Circuits, and con-
cluded that:
The difficulties involved in reaching coherent interpretations
of our labor law are manifest. They ought not to be compounded
by requiring the settling of these questions in the context of a
hastily called injunction proceeding.
The rule of law relied upon by the petitioner may be ques-
tioned, but as it certainly cannot be characterized as unsubstantial
of 'frivolous,' it is not for me at this time to pass upon its cor-
rectness....
Nevertheless, as the petitioner's view of this unsettled corner
of the law is certainly not without merit, nor 'frivolous' or un-
substantial, I must grant the temporary injunction if the evidence
adduced indicates that petitioner has reasonable cause to believe
that respondent violated the Act as petitioner interprets it.54
The court found on the facts, reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the two newspapers were not commonly con-
trolled, and enjoined the picketing.
In the Mack Trucks case,5 the union, in furtherance of
a strike against that company, picketed at an entrance
which had been marked and set aside for the use of con-
tractors and their employees who were engaged in construc-
54Id. at 853-54.
55 Schauffler v. Local 677, UAW, 201 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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tion work on Mack's premises. The petitioner contended
that the entrance, which consisted of a dirt road leading
across an unfenced field from. a street to one of the com-
pany's buildings, was a "gate" within the meaning of the
"reserve gate" doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court
in the General Electric case,5" and that the picketing was
secondary and therefore unlawful. The court concluded
that this legal proposition "may be uncertain when tested
by appropriate legal standards," but is not "unreasonable
or frivolous ... since the inferences to be drawn from the
decided cases do not completely exclude the possibility that
the Board's position is correct." 11 The court further con-
eluded that the rationale of the Phelps Dodge " decision,
approved by the Supreme Court in General Electric, was
consistent with equating "entrance" with "gate," although
the entrance in the instant case was not a gate within the
generally accepted usage of the term.
The preponderance of authority suggests that in testing
the reasonableness of the proposition of law advanced by
the petitioner, the district court may take into considera-
tion relevant statutory language, Board and court decisions,
legislative history and applicable logic; but that in the
absence of a final and binding decision of the Supreme
Court, no one factor is decisive. Howevei the proposition
of law is ordinarily deemed substantial if supported by
any one of the considerations, unless that proposition is
clearly untenable in light of the other considerations. The
petitioner ought not to be precluded from obtaining in-
junctive relief because of an adverse Board or court
decision, if there is a reasonable basis for concluding that
his position will ultimately become settled law. Every case
is potentially a Supreme Court case, and Congress em-
powered the district courts to grant injunctive relief to
preserve the issues for the orderly determination as pro-
56Local 761, Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
57201 F. Supp. at 638-39.
58United Steel Workers v. NLRB, 126 NLRB 1367, aff'd, 289 F.2d 591
(2d Cir. 1961).
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vided in the Act, at least during the pendency of litigation
before the Board."0
The reasonable cause test applies to all of the legal
and factual elements upon which the petitioner premises
his conclusion that the Act has been violated, including
some which might be deemed jurisdictional. For example,
the petitioner need only establish reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the employer or employers involved are engaged
in commerce or in industry affecting commerce, or meet
the Board's self-imposed standards for asserting jurisdiction
in a particular case; or that a respondent is a labor or-
ganization or the agent of a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.60
The district court ordinarily will not consider issues
whose resolution is peculiarly within the discretion of the
Board. Thus, in an action to enjoin a strike or related
conduct in furtherance of an alleged jurisdictional dispute,
the court will not consider the merits of that dispute, except
insofar as they bear on the question of whether in fact
the union is striking to obtain disputed work; nor whether
or not there is satisfactory evidence that the parties have
agreed upon a method for the voluntary adjustment of the
dispute, which would preclude the Board from determining
the merits of that dispute."'
The extent to which the district court may inquire into
the validity of a Board-conducted election or of the Board's
certification of the results of that election, is not clear.
Section 9 of the Act empowers the Board to conduct repre-
sentation elections and to certify the results thereof. A
59 For other cases which illustrate the reasonable cause test as applied
to legal issues, see American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v.
Getreu (L.B. Wilson), 258 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1958); McLeod v. Local 32-E,
Build. Service Employees (Dutch Lane Apartments, Inc.), 227 F. Supp.
242 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Getreu v. Armco Steel Corp., 241 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.
Ohio 1964).
6OSee NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades, 341 U.S. 675 (1951); Madden
v. Masters, Mates & Pilots, 259 F.2d 312 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
909 (1958). For a contrary view, see LeBaron v. Kern County Farm Labor
Union (DiGiorgio), 80 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
61See Schauffler v. Local 1291, ILA (Northern Metal Co.), 292 F.2d
182 (3d Cir. 1961); Operating Eng'rs Local 450 v. Elliot (Sline Indus.
Painters), 256 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1958); Schauffler v. United Ass'n of
Journeymen (Frank W. Hake), 218 F2d 476 (3d Cir. 1955).
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Board order certifying the results of an election or any
other order entered by the Board in a representation pro-
ceeding, is an interim order rather than a final order ad-
judicating the rights of the parties. Such orders are there-
fore normally reviewable by a court of appeals only where
the dispute concerning the correctness of the certification
eventuates in a finding that an unfair labor practice has
been committed, as where an employer refuses to bargain
with a certified union on the ground that the election
was held in an inappropriate bargaining unit, or where
a union charged with picketing an employer for recogni-
tion or organizational purposes within a year of a Board-
conducted election contends that the employer engaged in
misconduct which rendered the election invalid. The entire
election procedure becomes part of the record upon which
the final Board order is based and is then fully review-
able in a court of appeals. The federal district courts
have very limited jurisdiction to enjoin the conduct of
Board representation proceedings, only when the Board
has acted in excess of its delegated powers and contrary
to a specific prohibition of the Act, and possibly when the
Board has infringed upon a constitutional right.2
Some courts have suggested that where a Board cer-
tification eventuates in an unfair labor practice charge,
and the regional director petitions a district .court for
injunctive relief pending disposition of that charge by the
Board, the district court may pass upon the validity of a
Board certification order only to the extent of ascertaining
whether the Board had acted within the scope of its
statutory powers and whether the election had comported
with due process of law. In the New York Skipping
Assooiation case, 8 a section 10.(j) proceeding, the district
court enjoined the union from striking to compel the
employer association to bargain for a coastwide unit,
although the Board had certified the union as bargaining
2See Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964).
43 Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.
N.Y. 1956), aff'd, 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957); a similar result was
reached in McLeod v. National Maritime Union (Moore McCormack), 157
F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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representative of longshoremen only for the Port of Greater
New York. The court assumed that the certification en-
compassed a unit appropriate for collective bargaining pur-
poses, noting that the sole jurisdiction to review Board
representation proceedings lies in the court of appeals,
and that it would not usurp that function.
In Kansas Color Press," a district court enjoined the
union from engaging in recognitional picketing of an em-
ployer within one year of a Board-conducted election in
which the employees had voted against representation by
any union. The union contended that the election was
invalid, inter alia, because the employer had committed
unfair labor practices which affected the outcome of the
election. The district court declined to pass upon the
validity of the election, except to ascertain that the re-
presentation proceeding had accorded with the due process
of law. However, the tenth circuit remanded the case to
the district court for the purpose of considering the issues
raised by the union, at least for the purpose of ascertaining
whether there was reasonable cause to believe that the
election was valid."
The conflict between the rationale of the New York
Shipping case, and the decision of the tenth circuit in
Kansas Color Press, may be more apparent than real. The
Board has wide discretion in determining whether a unit
is appropriate for collective bargaining purposes. In the
absence of evidence indicating that the Board had abused
its discretion by violating a statutory proscription, e.g., by
including guards in a unit with other employees, the district
court would be warranted in assuming that there was
reasonable cause to believe that the certified unit was
appropriate.6 Because of this discretion vested in the
Board, district courts have usually refrained from con-
sidering issues raised with respect to the appropriateness
of a bargaining unit, even in the absence of a Board deter-
64Lawrence Typographical Union v. Sperry, 238 F. Supp. 498 (D. Kan.
1964).5356 F2d 58 (10th Cir. 1966).
O6See Brown v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 218 F2d 542 (9th Cir. 1954).
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mination. Thus, when the regional director has contended
that certain employees were included in a certified bar-
gaining unit, or conversely, that they were not included
in a bargaining unit, the courts have acquiesced in that
conclusion, for the purposes of an injunction proceeding,
because the Board could resolve the matter "with equal
propriety" either way. 7 However, where the continuing
vitality of a certification has been questioned not because
the unit is no longer appropriate for bargaining, but be-
cause the certified union has allegedly lost the support
of a majority of the employees, or has abandoned its
representative status, the district courts have considered
such issues in the same manner as any other issue; that is,
subject to the reasonable cause test." The reasonable cause
test is applicable to any issue raised concerning the validity
of a certification, which is not peculiarly within the Board's
discretion to resolve, because an injunction order, unlike
a Board certification order, has the operative effect of
adjudicating the rights of the parties involved, if only
temporarily. The district court is therefore warranted in
making a preliminary determination with respect to all
elements of the petitioner's case before granting injunetive
relief.
WHAT IS JUST AND PROPER RELEF?
Sections 10(j) and 10(1) each empower the district
court, upon the filing of the petition, to grant to the Board
such temporary relief or restraining order "as it deems just
and proper." Neither section defines the term "just and
proper." However, most courts are in agreement that the
propriety of injunctive relief in these cases turns not upon
traditional equity criteria applicable in suits between
private parties, but upon the necessity for effectuating the
statutory policy.
67See Local 83, Constr., Bldg. Materials & Drivers Union v. Jenkins
(B. F. Goodrich), 308 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1961); Schauffler v. Local
1357, Retail Clerks (Best Markets), 199 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
6s See Kennedy v. Warehouse & Distrib. Workers (Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. of St. Louis), 37 L.R.R.M. 2496 (ED. Mo. 1956); Waers v.
Electrical Workers (Peery Electric Co.), 68 L.R.R.M. 2972 (D. Colo. 1968).
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The weight of judicial authority does not accord with
the Tenth Circuit's statement that a section 10 (1) proceeding
"is an equitable action in which the maxims of equity are
fully applicable and under ... the statute the lower court
has discretionary power to issue or deny an injunction." 69
Application of specific maxims of equity has been rejected
in both section 10(1) and 10(j) injunction proceedings.
In the Delaware Valley Beer Distributors Association case, 0
a secondary boycott action, the union by way of affirmative
defense contended that injunctive relief should be denied
because some of the employer members of the association,
with whom the union had its primary dispute, had engaged
in inequitable behavior and/or unfair labor practices. The
court rejected this defense holding that the clean hands
doctrine was not applicable in a proceeding where a gov-
ernment agency was seeking to enforce its order in the
public interest. The court noted that in any event the
regional director, and not Delaware Valley, was the party
of record. In another 10(1) proceeding, a district court
rejected the union's contention that the petitioner was tardy
in not asserting his rights to injunctive relief promptly after
the unfair labor practice charge was filed, because "no
laches of a public servant can bar relief in this type of a
case." "' However, the court noted that it might take into
consideration any unreasonable delay by the Board in
processing the case, when determining whether an injunc-
tion should be granted or permitted to remain in effect.
Application of the maxim de minimus non eurat lem was
rejected by the Second Circuit in the Abraham Kaplan
case,"2 when that circuit reversed a district court order
refusing to enjoin the ILA from threatening employees
represented by the Painters Union in furtherance of ILA's
68 Sperandeo v. Local 537, Milk Drivers (Sealtest Foods), 334 F.2d 381
(10th Cir. 1964).
70 Schauffler v. Brewery & Beer Distrib. Drivers, 162 F. Supp. 1
(E.D. Pa. 1958).
71Hull v. Sheet Metal Workers (Burt Mfg. Co.), 161 F. Supp. 161,
173 (W.D. Ohio 1958). To the same effect see Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d
655 (10th Cir. 1967).
72 Douds v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., 242 F.2d 808 (2d Cir.
1957).
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claim for work being performed by those employees, be-
cause the district court, inter alia, considered the dispute
too trivial to warrant an injunction. Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit declined to "balance the equities" when it reversed
a district court order denying a 10(j) injunction in
Brown v. Paoifi-c Telephone (- Telegraph Co." In that case
the Board sought to enjoin the company from refusing to
bargain with a union which was the certified bargaining
representative for three separate geographical units of main-
tenance employees, and from merging one of the groups
into a plantwide bargaining unit represented by another
union. The company contended that it had acted in good
faith in reliance upon the language of a Board decision
which noted teclmological and other changes in the com-
pany's operations, and thereby seemed to question the con-
tinued appropriateness of the certified units. The company
offered to maintain the status quo as of the date the
Board issued a supplemental decision indicating that it
had not passed upon the appropriateness of the certified
units. Commenting upon this argument, Judge Pope stated
in a concurring opinion that "[h]owever valid this conten-
tion might be were we dealing with private rights in private
litigation, I think that since this injunction is sought for the
protection of the public interest and in aid of a policy
which Congress itself has made plain, the area for the
exercise of the traditional discretion not to grant an in-
junction is much more limited." " The majority opinion
noted that lapse of time and good faith were no defense
to the employer's refusal to bargain in the certified units.
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion in the Sealtest case"'
that the maxims of equity were fully applicable in these
proceedings, was made in the context of an apparent refusal
by the regional director to produce Board records sub-
poenaed by the respondent union. The regional director
had sought to enjoin the union from maintaining and giving
73218 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1954).
74 1d. at 544.
75 Sperandeo v. Local 537, Milk Drivers (Sealtest Foods), 334 F.2d 381
(10th Cir. 1964).
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effect to an alleged "hot cargo" agreement. The union con-
tended that the records were needed to substantiate its
defense that the regional director had acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in bringing the action. The director moved
to quash the subpoena because the records were privileged
from disclosure by the Board's rules. The district court
denied the motion and directed that the records be pro-
duced in camera. The director agreed to this proceeding
on the understanding that he could thereafter decline to
comply with any order to produce the records in open court,
and move to dismiss the case. The court construed this
conditional offer as a refusal to comply with its directive,
and dismissed the petition for an injunction.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's
conclusion that "it was for the court, not the governmental
agency, . . . to determine whether the documents sought
to be withheld under a claim of privilege are entitled to
the protection of that privilege." " The appellate court
further concluded that good cause was shown for the pro-
duction of the records by the fact the petitioner had not
sought relief against two other parties who, it was alleged,
engaged in the same misconduct as the union. "Thus, the
appellants' good faith is squarely in issue, and obviously,
the [subpoenaed documents] may be relevant to that
issue." "
Wholly apart from the questions of procedure and
governmental privilege raised in the Sealtest case, the Tenth
Circuit's conclusion that good cause had been shown for
production of the records based on the Board's failure to
proceed against all parties is questionable. The fact that
the district court dismissed the case without receiving the
records, of course precluded a direct confrontation on the
issue of whether the regional director had acted arbitrarily
in petitioning for an injunction. However, the law is well
established that the Board cannot proceed against a person
unless that person has been named in an unfair labor
practice charge; and that the Board may issue a complaint
76 Id. at 394.
'77 Id. at 3S5.
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against one party to an allegedly unlawful contract without
proceeding against other parties to that contract."' Con-
sidering that 1) the Board's jurisdiction to decide unfair
labor practice cases is invoked only upon the filing of a
charge; 2) the discretion exercised by the General Counsel
in determining whether a complaint shall issue is not sub-
ject to judicial review; and 3) the district court in these
injunction proceedings may grant relief only with respect
to the unfair labor practices alleged in the petition, it would
appear that the court may not withhold injunctive relief
by reason of the failure of the regional director to proceed
against persons not named as respondents. However, a
close question might be presented if the petitioner alleged
that two or more respondents had engaged in the same
or related unfair labor practices which were subject to the
mandatory injunction procedure of section 10(1), and that
a complaint should issue against them (or in the case of a
jurisdictional dispute, that a notice of hearing should issue),
but the director did not request an injunction against all
of them. Such a situation was presented in the Newark
,- Essew Plastering case,79 which involved a jurisdictional
dispute between the Lathers and Carpenters Unions. The
Carpenters struck to obtain the disputed work; the em-
ployer capitulated to their demand; whereupon the Lathers
struck. The district court refused to enjoin the Lathers
unless the Carpenters were also named as a party re-
spondent. A confrontation was avoided when the regional
director reconsidered his position that an injunction against
the Carpenters was not warranted, and complied with the
court's directive. On appeal by the Carpenters Union, the
third circuit noted that had the regional director elected
to challenge this action of the court, "a serious question
would have been presented" as to how far a court may go
in interfering with administrative judgment.
78 See, e.g., Local 546, Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees (Minnesota
Milk Co.), 133 NLRB 1314, 1321-22, enf'd, 314 F2d 761 (8th Cir. 1963).
Compare Retail Clerks v. Food Employers Council, 351 F.2d 525 (9th Cir.
1965).
79 Douds v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers, 245 F2d 223 (3d Cir. 1957).
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As already noted, Congress mandated the Board to
seek injunctive relief against jurisdictional disputes, sec-
ondary boycotts, and strikes for specifically defined objec-
tives because "time is usually of the essence in these
matters," and the relatively slow administrative procedure
fell short of the desired objectives of eliminating the ob-
structions to commerce and encouraging peaceful collective
bargaining."0 As "the proper working of the scheme fash-
ioned by Congress to determine industrial controversies
fairly and peaceably demands that the courts quite as much
as the administrative body act as Congress has required," 51
the courts are generally in agreement that once having
found reasonable cause to believe that a violation has been
committed, their discretion to withhold relief in 10(1) pro-
ceedings is extremely limited. It is not for the district
court to pass upon the "public interest or necessity" for
injunctive relief in these cases, because these matters were
decided upon by Congress when it passed the Taft-Hartley
Act. 2  Judge Sweigert noted in the Employing Lithogra-
phers case,3 that in no instance has a court finding reason-
able cause to believe that there has been a violation, and
that the violation is of a continuing nature, been sustained in
its denial of a 10(1) injunction upon discretionary consid-
erations concerning its conception of what might or might
not be in the public interest. Accordingly, Judge Sweigert
enjoined the union from striking an employer association to
obtain a contract containing certain alleged hot cargo pro-
visions, notwithstanding his conclusion that an injunction
might upset an established and theretofore legal practice,
and tend to prevent or delay settlement of a strike. 4
so See supra note 4. Compare Retail Clerks v. Food Employers Council,
351 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1962).
s1NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318, 343 (1940). See also
Douds v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 99 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1951).
82 See Douds v. Int. Longshoremen's Ass'n, 242 F.2d 808 (2d Cir. 1957).
S3 Brown v. Local 17, Amalgamated Litho., 180 F. Supp. 294, 308
(N.D. Cal. 1960).
84 For a contrary view see LeBaron v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council (Westinghouse), 84 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
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As Judge Sweigert indicated, a district court has dis-
cretion to withhold injunctive relief where the alleged
unlawful conduct has ceased and is not likely to resume.
For example, where a union engages in alleged secondary
picketing in furtherance of its dispute with the primary
employer, but terminates that conduct upon the execution
of a collective bargaining agreement with the employer,
thereby resolving the primary dispute, injunctive relief
would no longer be warranted, even though the employer
might wish to pursue its unfair labor practice charge before
the Board in order to establish a legal precedent or obtain
the sanction of a Board order in the event of a future
dispute with the union. Even in the absence of a resolution
of the primary dispute, the court may decline to grant an
injunction where the alleged unlawful conduct was of short
duration and did not achieve its objective, the union has
assured the court that it will not resume the unlawful con-
duct, and the circumstances of the case indicate that the
court may rely upon that assurance. In such cases the
practice has been for the district court to retain the case on
its docket subject to the right of the regional director to
renew his application in the event of a threatened or actual
resumption of the unlawful conduct. However, the district
court is not bound to accept the assurances of a respondent
or its counsel as a satisfactory substitute for an injunction,
which carries sanctions not present if there is a failure to
comply with such assurances. 5
An injunction proceeding is not rendered moot where
the unlawful conduct has ceased because the respondent has
attained the proscribed object, e.g., where as a result of a
strike or picketing, a neutral employer has agreed to cease
handling the products of the primary employer, or an em.
ployer involved in a jurisdictional dispute has reassigned
85 See, e.g., McMahon v. District Council of Carpenters (Artcraft Venetian
Blind Co.), 35 L.R.R.M. 2067 (E.D. Mo. 1964); Douds v. Milk Drivers
Local 680 (Crowley's Milk Co.), 133 F. Supp. 336 (D.NJ. 1955); Green
-v. Bangor Bldg. Trades Council (J.R. Cianchette), 165 F. Supp. 902 (D.
Me. 1948). Comoare Retail Clerks v. Food Employers Council, 351 F.2d
525 (9th Cir. 1965).
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the disputed work, unless in either case there has been a
resolution of the primary dispute by all parties involved."'
Nor, in a construction industry situation, is the proceeding
moot because the particular project involved has been com-
pleted, where the facts indicate that a respondent union
will engage in a repetition of alleged unlawful conduct at
some future time and plae.8
Unlike section 10(1), which imposes a mandatory duty
on the Board to seek injunctive relief whenever a complaint
is to be issued alleging unfair labor practices covered by
that section, section 10(j) gives the Board discretion to
seek injunctive relief when a complaint is issued alleging
other unfair labor practices. The legislative history indi-
cates that Congress imposed no readily identifiable limita-
tion on the Board's exercise of that discretion; the Board
may seek relief "if the circumstances call for such relief." 8
The courts are in general agreement that their discre-
tion in 10(j) cases, although governed by the necessity for
effectuating the statutory policy, is greater than in 10(1)
proceedings, and that an injunction must be predicated on
something more than reasonable cause to believe that an
unfair labor practice has been committed. The extent of
that discretion has been the subject of three recent appel-
late decisions. In Angle v. Sacks, 9 the Tenth Circuit under-
took to define the standard for the exercise of judicial dis-
SO See Douds v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n (Abraham Kaplan),
242 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1957); Graham v. ILWU (Alaska Salmon Indus.,
Inc.), 26 L.R.R.M. 2290 (W.D. Wash. 1950).
-9 Shore v. Building & Constr. Trades Council (Petredis & Fryer),
173 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1949).
ssAngle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967). In practice the Board
has invoked section 10(j) very selectively. During the fourteen-year period
immediately following passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board applied
for pendente lite relief in only 46 cases. In 1961, a subcommittee on the
National Labor Relations Board of the House Committee on Education and
Labor criticized the Board for not utilizing section 10(j) more extensively.
Since that time the Board has expanded its use of the discretionary injunc-
tion procedure. However, during the four-year period from July 1, 1963
through June 30, 1967, the Board filed an average of nineteen petitions
for 10(j) relief per year, in contrast to an average of more than two hun-
dred 10(l) petitions filed during the same period.
S9 Id.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
cretion, using the legislative history of section 10(j) as a
guide:
We find nothing in the legislative history, of section 10(j) declar-
ing or suggesting that the Board's discretion in seeking section
10(j) relief should be limited to those emergencies endangering
the national welfare or to situations with 'heavy and meaningful
repercussions,' or to situations that have a demonstrably prejudicial
impact on the public. The concern of Congress was rather that the
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act could be defeated in
particular cases by the passage of time...
We do think, however, that the legislative history indicates a
standard in addition to the 'probable cause' finding that must be
satisfied before a district court grants relief. The circumstances of
the case must demonstrate that there exists a probability that the
purposes of the Act will be frustrated unless temporary relief is
granted. Administration of the Act is vested by Congress in the
Board, and when the circumstances of a case create a reasonable
apprehension that the efficacy of the Board's final order may be
nullified, or the administrative procedures will be rendered mean-
ingless, temporary relief may be granted under section 10(j). Pres-
ervation and restoration of the status quo are then appropriate
considerations in granting temporary relief pending determination of
the issues by the Board.90
Although preservation and restoration of the status quo
are "appropriate considerations," two other courts of ap-
peals have differed as to whether the need to preserve the
status quo or prevent irreparable harm is an indispensable
prerequisite for injunctive relief. In the General Electric
case,"' the Second Circuit reversed a section 10(j) injunction
because the Board had not demonstrated that the injunction
was necessary to preserve the status quo or to prevent any
irreparable harm. However, the Eighth Circuit indicated
that where the public interest is affected, such considera-
tions might not control the allocation of temporary injunc-
tive relief.9" In the words of the district court judge in the
90Id. at 660.
91 McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y.),
reV'd, 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 533
(1967). "Status quo" has been defined as "the last uncontested status which
preceded the pending controversy." Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meters,
385 F.2d 265, 273 (8th Cir. 1967).92 See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meters, 385 F2d 265 (8th Cir.
1967).
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G eera. Electrio case, "the remedy of Section 10 (j) is surely
appropriate and available when the impact upon the public
interest is grave enough to justify swifter corrective action
than the normal process of Board adjudication and court
enforcement." 11
Past judicial practice indicates that the courts are dis-
posed to grant relief where the alleged unfair labor prac-
tices, if permitted to continue, would have an adverse
impact on the public interest. For example, the courts have
enjoined strikes in the coal and newspaper publishing indus-
tries to perpetuate or obtain closed shop conditions, because
those industries were deemed vital to the public welfare. 4
Similarly, the Second Circuit affirmed an order enjoining a
union from striking to modify or terminate an existing
contract without the requisite notices having been given the
federal and state mediation services.9 The strike had re-
sulted in failure to complete the concreting of a sewer
under construction, thereby endangering water mains, sew-
ers and power cables in the street. The court of appeals
agreed with the district court that an injunction was neces-
sary for the protection of the public interest and preserva-
tion of the status quo. Section 10(j) has also been utilized
to enjoin mass picketing and violence which was not effec-
tively checked by local authorities, and to enjoin interfer-
ence with Board proceedings, such as acts of reprisal
against witnesses in a Board conducted hearing and unfair
labor practices which tended to interfere with the conduct
of a Board election.
There appears to be general agreement with the holding
of Angle v. Sacks, that injunctive relief is warranted to
preserve or restore the status quo or to prevent irreparable
injury to the employees, union or employer involved, even
in the absence of any demonstrable impact upon the public
93 257 F. Supp. at 708.
94 See Jaffee v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers Union, 97 F. Supp. 443
(S.D.N.Y. 1951); Madden v. United Mine Workers, 79 F. Supp. 616
(D.D.C. 1948); Penello v. United Mine Workers, 88 F. Supp. 935 (D.
D.C. 1950).
9 5MeLeod v. Sewer Constr. Workers (Catapano-Grow Constr.), 292
F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1961).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
interest. Typical of such situations was that in Angle v.
Sacks itself, where an employer, confronted with a union
organizational drive, engaged in acts of intimidation, threats
and discharge of union adherents, which if unchecked would
have effectively dissipated the union's strength, and thereby
rendered any prospective Board order an empty formality.
District courts have joined such conduct and directed the
reinstatement of the alleged discriminatees pending Board
disposition of the case.96 Similarly, the courts have been
disposed to grant injunctive relief where an employer, con-
fronted with confficting claims for recognition by rival
unions, has unlawfully assisted one union by staffing its
operations exclusively with members of that union, or by
recognizing and executing a collective bargaining agreement
with that union. As such conduct tends to entrench the
assisted union at the expense of its rival, injunctive relief
has been deemed warranted to prevent the irreparable harm
which the disfavored union may suffer by the drifting away
of its members to the union favored by the employer. Such
relief may include an order directing the employer to recog-
nize and bargain with the disfavored union where that
union is entitled to recognition by reason of a Board cer-
tification, incumbent status as bargaining representative, or
demonstrated support of that union by a majority of em-
ployees. The court may not condition its injunction on the
holding of an election, if under applicable law the Board
itself would not direct an election, as such condition would
run contrary to the statutory scheme.9 7
A particularly troublesome area for the exercise of the
court's discretion has been those cases in which the Board
requests injunctive relief which would effectively alter rather
96See, e.g., Elliott v. DuBois Chem., 201 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Tex.
1962). Both the Angle and DuBois cases involved relatively small units
of employees, hence even a strike by the employees in protest of the
employer's unfair labor practices would probably have had little demon-
strable impact upon the general public.
97See. e.g., Kaynard v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 66 L.R.R.M. 2052
(E.D.N.Y. 1967); Rains v. East Tenn. Packing Co., 240 F. Supp. 770
(E.D. Tenn. 1965); Fusco v. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 465
(N.D. Ohio 1962) ; Brown v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 218 F.2d 542
(9th Cir. 1954); Jaffee v. Henry Heide, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
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than preserve or restore the status quo, e.g., where the
Board seeks to compel an employer to bargain with a newly
certified union, and the employer contests that union's right
to recognition. A recent decision of the Fourth Circuit
indicated that a bargaining order might be warranted if
the union was being eroded and its strength undercut dur-
ing the litigation of the unfair labor practice charge based
on the employer's refusal to bargain." The Eighth Circuit
also implied that injunctive relief would be available if the
employer's conduct threatened or resulted in a strike."'
The General Electric o10 and Minnesota, Mining "o cases
each involved a refusal by the company to bargain with the
union because of the presence on the union's negotiating
committee of individuals who were also representatives of
other labor organizations. Prior negotiations between the
parties had been conducted without the participation of
such "outsiders." In General Electric, the Second Circuit
reversed the injunction because that order was not neces-
sary to preserve the status quo or prevent irreparable harm.
District Court Judge Frankel had concluded that the case
warranted injunctive relief to protect the public interest,
as the employer was "a huge and basic enterprise with sub-
stantial impact upon the national defense and the economy
generally." 102 The parties negotiated a contract before the
Supreme Court could determine the applicable standard for
injunctive relief. In Minnesota Mining, the Eighth -Circuit
reversed the injunction order because it concluded that the
circumstances demonstrated neither an adverse impact upon
the public interest, nor a need to maintain the status quo
or prevent irreparable harm.
OSNLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 389 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1967).9OLeBus v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 702
(W.D. La. 1963), cited with approval in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Meters, 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967). The Aerovax case involved an
application by the Board pursuant to section 10(e) of the Act, for enforce-
ment pendente lite of a Board order directing the company to bargain with
the union. The court concluded that the prerequisites for relief pending
appeal were the same as those applicable in 10(j) proceedings.00 McLeod v. General Elec. Co., 257 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
101 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meters, 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967).
102257 F. Supp. 690, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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Must the Board meet a higher burden of proof than
that of "reasonable cause" in order to justify its request for
an injunction which is "mandatory" in character, e.g., which
affirmatively requires an employer to reinstate alleged dis-
criminatees or bargain with a union pending litigation be-
fore the Board? In the Welington Manufacturing case,"'3
a district court enjoined an employer from discharging
union adherents and otherwise engaging in coercive conduct
during the course of a union organizing campaign, but re-
fused to order reinstatement of three alleged discriminatees
in the absence of a "clear" showing that their discharges
were unlawful, as opposed to a mere showing of reasonable
cause. The court cited as authority an earlier decision of a
California district court."' However, these cases appear
to stand alone in support of the proposition that the right
to reinstatement pendente lite must be established by a clear
case. A somewhat comparable theory was rejected by the
Supreme Court when it held that the courts of appeals in
reviewing Board orders may not apply a more onerous test
of substantiality of evidence in reinstatement cases than
that applied in other cases.0 5
Two seemingly contradictory considerations of con-
gressional intent are present in those cases in which the
Board seeks an injunction to compel an employer to recog-
nize and bargain with a union pending litigation before the
Board. One is the intent of Congress that the remedial
purposes of the Act should not be frustrated by the continu-
ing effect of unfair labor practices during the pendency of
litigation before the Board. The other consideration is that
Congress, in making it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse to bargain with the representative of his
employees, thereby enabled an employer who doubted the
validity of a Board election, or otherwise questioned whether
he was obligated to bargain with a union, to refuse to bar-
gain and thereby permit his doubts to be tested in an unfair
103 Johnston v. Wellington Mfg. Div., 49 L.R.RM. 2536 (W.D.S.C. 1961).
104 Brown v. National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards, 104 F. Supp.
685 (N.D. Cal. 1951). For a contrary view see Reynolds v. Curley Printing
Co., 247 F. Supp. 317 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
105NLPB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962).
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labor practice proceeding.Y Where the employer has en-
gaged in other unfair labor practices, or has otherwise
evidenced that his refusal to bargain is based not upon a
good faith doubt of his obligation to do so, but upon a
desire to gain time in which to undermine the union, the
latter consideration may be disregarded. The Aerovow
case 1 0 7 suggests that even when an employer in good faith
questions his obligation to bargain, injunctive relief is war-
ranted if the continuing effect of the employer's refusal to
deal with a union tends to erode that union's support among
his employees. In the absence of such circumstances, dis-
trict courts have tended to deny an injunction where the
employer has raised a substantial question concerning his
asserted obligation to bargain, but to grant an injunction
where the employer has refused to bargain on grounds
which are frivolous or unsupported by applicable law.
The scope of relief in both section 10(j) and 10(1)
cases is generally governed by standards applicable to Board
decisions. The district court is empowered to enjoin acts
which are of the same type or class as unlawful acts which
the court has found to have been committed or whose com-
mission in the future, unless enjoined, may fairly be anti-
cipated from the respondent's conduct in the past.0 " The
court may direct such affirmative relief, including the post-
ing or mailing of notices, as is necessary to dissipate the
effect of the alleged unfair labor practices.19
DURATION OF THE INJUNCTION
Section 10(1) mandates the regional director to peti-
tion for injunctive relief "pending the final adjudication of
the Board with respect to" the unfair labor practice charge.
108 See ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann), 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
An employer who executed a collective bargaining agreement in the good
faith but mistaken belief that a union represented a majority of his em-
ployees in an appropriate bargaining unit would be guilty of an unfair
labor practice.
107 NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 389 F2d 475 (4th Cir. 1967).
lesSee NLRB v. Fxpress Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941).109 See Schauffler v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers (Horn & Hardart
Baking Co.), 230 F2d 7, 13-14 (3d Cir. 1956).
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"Final adjudication" may take one of several forms, depend-
ing upon the ultimate disposition of the case, such as:
Board approval of a withdrawal of the charge, and the dis-
missal of any complaint based thereon; closing of the case
upon full compliance with the terms of an informal settle-
ment agreement, or with a trial examiner's decision; the
entry of a consent order of the Board in accordance with
the terms of a formal settlement agreement; or the entry of
the Board's decision and order in a contested case. In a
jurisdictional dispute case, the injunction does not expire
upon the Board's determination of the dispute against the
striking union, as such determination is preliminary to a
dismissal of the unfair labor practice charge upon compli-
ance with the Board's award or to the issuance of a com-
plaint in the event of noncompliance.110 However, an award
of the disputed work in favor of the striking union, or a
Board order quashing the notice of hearing (e.g., because
the facts do not indicate the existence of a jurisdictional
dispute) necessitates dismissal of the unfair labor practice
charge and therefore constitutes the Board's ultimate dis-
position of the case."' The courts, in agreement with the
Board, have construed the language of section 10(1) as
limiting their jurisdiction to grant relief only during the
pendency of a case before the Board." This conclusion is
reinforced by sections 10(e) and (f) of the Act, which
vest exclusive jurisdiction in the court of appeals upon
the filing of a petition for enforcement or review of a
final Board order (together with the record in the case),
including the power to grant temporary relief or a re-
straining order at the request of the Board.
Section 10 (j) contains no language respecting the dura-
tion of the injunction. One district court held that once
the Board has entered its decision in a case, 10(j) relief is
not appropriate and that the Board instead should apply to
110 See Schauffler v. United Ass'n of Journeymen (Frank W. Hake), 218
F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1955).
"I See LeBus v. Seafarers' Union (Delta Steamship Line), 398 F.2d 281
(5th Cir. 1968).
112 See McLeod v. Mechanics Conf. Bd. (Remington Rand), 300 F.2d 234
(2d Cir. 1962).
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the court of appeals pursuant to section 10 (e). 1" However,
in the absence of qualifying statutory language, the district
courts apparently have jurisdiction to grant injunctive re-
lief pending compliance with the Board's order, or absent
compliance, with the filing of the case record in the court
of appeals in connection with a petition for enforcement or
review.
Should an injunction be dissolved or modified because
the Board's trial examiner recommends that the unfair
labor practice complaint be dismissed in whole or in part?
The mandate of section 10(1) apparently precludes an af-
firmative answer. 14
The discretionary nature of section 10(j) relief poses
the question in a different light. The Board's own rules
and regulations direct that in the event a trial examiner
hearing a complaint, concerning which the Board has proc-
essed 10(j) relief, recommands dismissal in whole or in
part, the regional attorney "shall forthwith suggest to the
district court ... the possible change in circumstances aris-
ing out of the findings and recommendations of the trial
examiner." 15 Accepting the rationale of the tenth circuit in
Angle v. Sacks, ° made in a different context, it could be
argued that injunctive relief would no longer be warranted
"to protect the efficacy" of a final Board order, because
the trial examiner's recommended dismissal constitutes "the
last ruling ... by the agency concerned." However, where
the facts before the district court indicated that the efficacy
of the Board's final order might be nullified or that ad-
ministrative procedures might be rendered meaningless,
in the absence of an injunction, it is difficult to see how
the need for injunctive relief would be rendered any less
223Jaffee v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers Union, 97 F. Supp. 443
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
114See Slater v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Grauman),
175 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1949). The court noted that since the General
Counsel filed timely exceptions to the trial examiner's decision, the case
remained pending before the Board without final decision, and rejected what
it characterized as the respondent union's suggestion that the district court
substitute the advisory determination of the trial examiner for its own,
made on a different record.
11529 C.F.R. § 102.94(b) (1968).
'110382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967).
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acute by reason of the adverse interim decision of the trial
examiner. The significance of the trial examiner's decision
lies not in whether the trial examiner found that the Act
was violated as alleged, but in whether the evidence adduced
at the hearing before him disclosed a failure of proof as
would render unlikely a Board order finding a violation,
or disclosed facts which mitigated the urgency of the need
for injunctive relief.
Notwithstanding the mandatory language of section
10(1), can the duration of an injunction become so long
by the passage of time, as to be unreasonable, thereby war-
ranting its dissolution? Certainly, as the tenth circuit
recognized in the Grauman case," 7 section 10(1) was de-
signed to preserve the status quo pending the entire pro-
cedures before the Board. Nevertheless, several courts have
held that a district court has discretion to dissolve an
injunction which in all the circumstances of the case has
apparently remained in effect for an unreasonable length
of time. In an appeal from an order enjoining a jurisdic-
tional strike, the third circuit criticized the Board for delay
in disposing of the case, noting that nine months had
elapsed from the issuance of the section 10(k) notice of
hearing to the oral argument before the court of appeals,
without any decision by the Board on the merits of the
dispute."8  The court suggested that the injunction might
raise a serious issue before the district court if continued
so long as to be no longer equitable, but nevertheless denied
the appeal. However, in another appeal involving an alleged
secondary boycott, where ten months had elapsed from the
close of hearing before the trial examiner without a Board
decision, although counsel had told the district court that
the Board would probably decide the case within two
months, the tenth circuit affirmed the injunction but re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether
the writ should be modified or terminated in advance of
117 Slater v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Grauman), 175 F2d
608 (10th Cir. 1949). r --
"a8 Douds v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers In!l Ass'n, 245 F.2d 223
(3d Cir. 1957).
[ VOL. 43
1969] INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND THE NLRB 393
the final adjudication of the Board."9  In the Greenfield
.Printing case," ° a district court, on motion of the union,
dissolved an injunction which had been in effect for two
years. The case involved alleged recognitional picketing.
Although a trial examiner's decision had issued, finding no
violation, the Board's counsel was unable to state when a
Board decision would be forthcoming. The court construed
its injunction order as limited to the final disposition of
the case before the Board (the express term of the order)
or to the passage of an unreasonable period of time,
whichever shall occur first, and concluded that in the
absence of unusual circumstances, two years was unrea-
sonable.
The foregoing decisions suggest that the power to ter-
minate a section 10 (1) injunction should be used sparingly,
where there is apparent inexcusable and unusually long
delay in the disposition of a Board case. As in the
Greenfield case, the usual injunction order provides that
the alleged unlawful conduct shall be enjoined pending the
final disposition of the matters involved pending before the
Board. However, a few district courts have limited in-
junctions to a specific period of time (usually from three
to six months), in the absence of a showing of good cause
why the injunction should remain in effect, or have pro-
vided that the respondent may move to vacate the writ if
the Board did not dispose of the case during such time.21
Congress in enacting sections 10(j) and 10(1) rec-
ognized the shortcomings inherent in "the relatively slow
procedure of the Board hearing and order, followed many
months later by an enforcing decree of the Circuit Court
110United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Sperry, 170 F.2d 863 (10th Cir. 1948).
The Board decided the case before the district court could consider the
remand.220Getreu v. International Typographical Union (Greenfield Printing),
205 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
121See, e.g., Alpert v. International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 163
F. Supp. 774 (D. Conn. 1958); McLeod v. Mailers Union, 50 L.R.PPM. 2001
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). No court of appeals has passed on the validity of such
an order although the entry of an order containing a time limitation was
noted in Building & Constr. Trades Council v. LeBaron, 181 F.2d 449
(9th Cir. 1949).
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of Appeals," and precisely because of those shortcomings,
empowered the Board to seek interim injunctive relief."
The nature of the administrative process, coupled with
the volume of litigation before the Board, usually precludes
the swift disposition of a contested unfair labor practice
case.'23 Therefore, it is not surprising, as one judge noted,
that the duration of an injunction may extend over a
period of six months or longer." A district court cannot
place a time limit on injunctive relief, short of final Board
disposition of the case, without 1) disregarding the con-
gressional intent to resolve the inequities resulting from
the nature of the administrative process in favor of injunc-
tive relief in certain cases and 2) failing to take into
consideration factors beyond the control of the Board such
as availability of personnel and caseload volume, or pro-
cedural problems in individual cases. Nevertheless, in light
of the swift moving realities of labor relations, the tem-
porary injunction contemplated by sections 10(j) and 10 (1)
might remain in effect for such a long period of time as to
amount to a final determination of the rights of the parties
involved. An answer consistent with the statutory scheme
would seem to be as suggested by the third and tenth
circuits and in the Greenfteld Printing case, that the in-
junction ordinarily should remain in effect during the
pendency of the entire case before the Board, but that an
unusual delay in the disposition of the case, in the absence
of circumstances tending to excuse such delay, constitutes
grounds for modifying or dissolving the injunction.
SUJMMARY
In brief, Congress has empowered the district courts
to grant to the Board appropriate pendente lite injunctive
relief upon a showing that there is reasonable cause to
believe that an employer or labor union has engaged in,
122See supra note 4.
123 In fiscal 1967, the five-member Board issued a total of 1262 decisions
in contested cases. 31 N.L.R.B. AxN. REP. 14 (1967).
124Fusco v. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 465 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
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or is engaging in, unfair labor practices. The district courts
are not powerless to withhold relief in such cases, but their
discretion to do so in cases covered by section 10(1) is
extremely narrow, because of the mandate of that section.
In all the proceedings, whether under section 10(j) or
section 10(1), the necessity for effectuating the statutory
policy, rather than traditional equity criteria applicable
in suits between private parties, governs the exercise of
the court's discretion. The preponderance of judicial autho-
rity indicates that injunctive relief is warranted under
section 10(j) to protect the public interest, to preserve
or restore the status quo, or to prevent irreparable harm
to the employer, union or employees involved.
